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from behind

mud; the other

pri
saw

the stars."
In this anonymous couplet, the
the law that impression precedes and
determines expression, while the psychol
ogist sees the law that apperception pre
cedes and determines perception. In both
orator

sees

senses, the couplet has a distinct bearing on
the problem of good and evil, for reactions
to this problem are largely a matter of per

sonal

impression

viewpoint, emphasis,

�

at

titude, and decision.
What men see is partly a matter of view
point. There can be no doubt that the view
of the world from a palace window is dif
ferent from the restrictive view from a
prison window. But here we meet a strange
fact. Often it is the "prisoner" in the palace
who sees the mud, while it is the "freeman"
in the prison who sees the stars. That is,
there is a psychological as well as a physi
cal viewpoint. The eyes are only a part of
the mechanism or process of vision; the
real seer is the mind, the self. Impressions
in the mind due to previous experience and
thinking determine what is seen. In ordi
see what
nary language, we say that men
they are looking for. In psychological ex

determines perception;
in
the
mind is active
process of vision. The
"mud" and "stars" are first in the mind. If
"mud" is in the absorbed vision, it is in the
stream of thought. Hence it is not strange
that the expressions of the arm-chair
philosopher looking out upon life from his
comfortable position differ from those of
the afflicted. Paradoxically, the spectator is

pression, conception

often the

pessimist.

There is logic in this seemingly illogical
contrast between the optimism of the suffer
er and the pessimism of the mere specta
tor. Sorley has shown that the sufferer of
ten has the better insight than the specta
tor who sees the whole mass of pain, ob

livious of the fact that it is not
up in actual life.

heaped

so

To estimate the true inwardness of suffering, we
must not go to the professional pessimist, who
counts up the grievances of humanity, as often as
not, from the vantage ground of a position of
personal comfort.*

Mill, for instance, gathered together

a

of abstractions which shut out his view
of the good, thus committing what Dr.
Brightman has called "the unpardonable
sin" of the philosopher, "indifference to
ward any area of experience."* And per
sonal
experience proves the truth of
Bowne's observation that the persons pitied
"are commonly having from their own
standpoint a pretty good time".* Bowne
adds that "the pessimistic illusion is com
pleted by attributing all the sum of pains
to the abstract man; and then all the con
ditions for the profound rhetorical
woe
are fully met."

pile

Of course, spectators differ in viewpoint
among themselves. Considering the world
as
a prison of finitude and mystery, we
might say, "Two men Mill and Royce
looked out from behind prison bars. One
saw the mud ; the other saw the stars." And
sufferers agree as well as disagree in view
point. "Two men Paul and Silas looked
out from behind prison bars. Both sang
hymns; both saw the stars." That is, the
religious man sees good and evil as one
-

-

-

-

problem, grasping creation, sin, evil, re
demption, and immortality as a tmit. He
perceives meaning and purposes to which
the irreligious are blind. Naturally, he
looks up rather than down, becoming, thus,
a problem to the irreligious, who can not
understand how
can

sing

at

men

midnight

with bleeding backs
in jail, when men or-
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dinarily complain
cumstances. It is

under such cir
matter of viewpoint ; in

or curse
a

the eyes of Paul and Silas, they were not
prisoners of Rome, but "of the Lord".*

Then, the problem of good and evil is a
matter of emphasis. "A
religious man is
one who asserts the
predominance of good
in the imiverse."" Attention is determined
by interest. One in jail can be aware of his
muddy environment without concentrating
attention upon it. Prisoners unjustly con
fined and suffering have it in their power
to look either at the mud or the stars, to
determine whether they are going to "curse
God" and take the easy way out, or to wor
ship God and continue to live and fight "to
make the world a better place in which to
live", in the hope that the time will come
when righteous men will not be jailed. This
attitude of not taking evil as a finality and
of regarding the real problem of evil as
the "problem of how to overcome specific
evils through intelligent activity,"" has the
approval of such philosophers as Hocking
and Wieman. It is certainly more practi
cal than mere speculation.
But it is harder for men to sing in their
afflictions when they are self-imposed.
Those suffering intense physical pain have

testified that the worst suffering is that of
an offended conscience. Vicarious suffering,
in which there is both a revelation and a
development of character, of the best in us,
such as sympathy, is easier to bear. Our
very capacity to "rejoice with those that
rejoice" demands that we "weep with those
that weep"'. The solidarity of the race ne
cessitates that we suffer for others.

So

good

we

or

may choose to emphasize either
evil, and our choice stamps us as

either optimists or pessimists. While it may
be true that an omnipotent God can not
make evil good, even a finite man might
make good come out of evil (as freedom
out of war), even as he might make evil
come out of good (as anarchy out of free
dom). While God can "make the wrath of
man to praise Him", so man can make the
*Philemon, 1.
'Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 240.
�Martin, Empirical Phildsophies of Religion, pp.

21, 111-112.

of God to curse Him (as in God's
generous gift of freedom to man). While
to some the world is best described as "a
vale of tears", Bosanquet, Sorley, and a

goodness

host

of religious people take the more
cheerful and practical view that it is "A
Vale of Soul-making". If, as Mill assumed,
the goal of life is happiness, pessimism
be

justified, that is, if there were
of
any way
calculating the pleasures and
pains of all time, past, present and future.
might

But optimists choose to regard character
the goal, being able to find a place for
evil and pain in the process that forwards
man
to that goal. Proverbially, the reli
gious sufferer is optimistic, even cheerful,
putting the more fortunate on-looker to
shame. It is a matter of emphasis.
as

Personal attitude is
the

a

decisive factor in

problem. Perhaps the

most

striking

characteristic of the world's greatest suffer
er, the Man of

His faith in
His Father, Pain was not the last word in
His life. Suffering intensely and unjustly,
dying an ignominious death, He transform
ed the instrument of His torture from an
emblem of shame to one of glory, illu

Sorrows,

was

strating the principle that pain changes its
character, not only through spiritual vision
but through "simple pastness or remem
brance.'" And it can be said of every vic
arious sufferer, "He shall see the travail of
His soul and be satisfied.'" But the one who
"freezes the process", who sees the cruci
fixion isolated, who judges the tree by its
green fruit, may have to declare the prob
lem ultimately insolvable on the basis of
theism.
Another determinative viewpoint is that
of humility. We should beware of any de

mand, implicit

explicit, for a
problem. To the

or

neat sol

ution for every
one con
scious of the limitations of human reason,
and of his dependence upon a higher wis
dom, this is irrational. With every problem
solved, he sees little, if any, room for re
ligious faith. In the eyes of many humble
Christians, the yielding to the desire on the
part of finite man "to know it all" at the

'Hocking,
perience, p.

The
220.

*Isa. 53:11.

Meaning of God

in Human Ex
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expense of faith, can only lead, as it has
lead from the beginning of the race, to evil
results. If v^e must have a solution for the
greatest problem of all, that of evil, or for

feit the

general theistic conception, if not
faith in God's very existence, we constitute
ourselves "gods, knowing
(completely)
good and evil". Hoffding sees no reason
why we should demand such answers at all
costs, nor "why we should fetter reason
for the sake of presumptive solutions which
only give us back our riddle in still larger
dimensions.'" A reasonable faith, i. e., a
humble attitude, will also prevent us from
trying "to put all our eggs into one basket" ;
obviously, what will explain one evil may
not explain another ; it is sufficient for each
explanation to make a contribution to the
general solution. And if we really know
only "in part" then we should suspend
judgment on a few things, at least. Would
it damage a philosopher's reputation, there
fore, to frankly confess sometimes, "I don't
know" ? Is there no place in the same world
for both faith and a wholesome measure of

agnosticism,

for the humble "I don't have

the answer, but I believe
Problem Solver has it"?

This attitude of
that of

reverence.

that

the Great

humility is very close to
One sufferer, baffled by

previous beliefs, unable to see the answer,
came
dangerously close to spiritual ship
wreck on the rocks of charging God with
injustice; Job finally won through, how
ever, to a place of sublime faith, genuine
humility, and commendable reverence. One
is favorably impressed also by the reverence
of Royce. Nowhere, not even implicitly,
does he reproach God for the evils of the
world, and he presents reasons for "greet
ing the unknown with a cheer."
Finally, this is a matter for personal de
cision. Is life worth living? No one can an�Hoflfding, The Philosophy of Religion,

p. 367.

for another, much less for the race.
Is pain the last word? Let the Man on the
Cross answer for Himself. There does

swer

seem

to be

a

pain is un
vanquished, dis

situation in which

endurable, "namely, when
honored, and abandoned, the wretch

must

gasp out his life in utter solitude,"" and
yet, need one feel alone in suffering? Let

the One who seemed to pass through that
experience answer again. That God suffers
with us gives meaning to the Master's
words: "Happy are you that mourn, for
you shall be comforted." "Which is

more

important, a present perfect world or future
perfect men? Let the Jobs of the world,
like R. L.

Stevenson, who have found both

expression and development of character in
imperfect conditions, answer. Is character
or pleasure the true goal of life? Let both
righteous and unrighteous sufferers answer,
and then compare their answers. Is God's
will for virture "baffled" as Mill said it is?
If so, by whom? Let the awakened con

science of the evil man answer. Is freedom
a blessing or a curse? Let the writer an
swer.
Realizing that morality demands
choice, and that choice, in turn, involves
an alternative (evil as well as good), and
faced with the choice of being non-existent
or a machine on the one hand, or of being
a

at

free, moral agent
the risk of

for

a

possible

the other

on

suffering

hand,

in time and

misuse of

freedom,

even

eternity
I would

gift of freedom.
If a man abused your gift of a safetyrazor to commit suicide, would you give
yourself up as a murderer? If so, do you

choose existence and the

believe that there

is

a

court

in the land

that would convict you? The final question
is also for the reader: what are you look
ing at, the "mud" or the "stars"?

"Hocking, Meaning df God in Human Expe
dience, p. 222.
"Matthew

5:4.

